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Chance in the Everett interpretation
Simon Saunders
It is unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. But,
as to what probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there has seldom
been such complete disagreement and breakdown of communication since the
Tower of Babel (Savage [1954 p.2]).
Abstract
The notion of objective probability or chance, as a physical trait of
the world, has proved elusive; the identification of chances with actual
frequencies does not succeed. An adequate theory of chance should ex-
plain not only the connection of chance with statistics, but with degrees of
belief, and more broadly the entire phenomenology of (seemingly) chance
events and their measurement. Branching structure in the decoherence-
based many worlds theory provides an account of what chance is that
satisfies all these desiderata, including the requirement that chance in-
volves uncertainty.1
For present purposes I take Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) to be the
unitary formalism of quantum mechanics divested of any probability interpreta-
tion, but including decoherence theory and the analysis of the universal state in
terms of emergent, quasiclassical histories, or branches, along with their branch
amplitudes, all entering into a vast superposition. I shall not be concerned with
arguments over whether the universal state does have this structure; those ar-
guments are explored elsewhere (see e.g. Saunders et al [2010 Part 1,2]). (But
I shall, later on, consider the mathematical expression of this idea of branches
in EQM in more detail.)
My argument is that the branching structures in EQM, as quantified by
branch amplitudes (and specifically as ratios of squared moduli of branch am-
plitudes) play the same roles that chances are supposed to play in one-world
theories of physical probability. That is, in familiar theories, we know that
(i) Chance is measured by statistics, and perhaps, among observable quanti-
ties, only statistics, but only with high chance.
(ii) Chance is quantitatively linked to subjective degrees of belief, or credences:
all else being equal, one who believes the chance of E is p will set his
credence in E equal to p (the so-called ‘principal principle’).
(iii) Chance involves uncertainty; chance events, prior to their occurrence, are
uncertain.
1This is a lightly edited reprint (with added footnotes and a new appendix) of ‘Chance
in the Everett interpretaiton’, in Many Worlds? Everett, quantum theory and reality, S.
Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace (Oxford 2010).
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Those seem the most important of the chance-roles.
My claim is that exactly similar statements can be shown to be true of
branching in EQM. In the spirit of Saunders [2005] and Wallace [2006], we should
conclude these branching structures just are chances, or physical probabilities.
This is the programme of ‘cautious functionalism’, to use Wallace’s term.
The argument continues: this identification is an instance of a general pro-
cedure in the physical sciences. Probabilities turn out to be functions of branch
amplitudes in much the same way that colours turn out to be functions of elec-
tromagnetic frequencies and spectral reflectancies, and heat and temperature
turn out to be functions of particle motions in classical statistical mechanics
– and in much the same way that sensible perceptions (of the sort relevant
to measurement and observation) turn out to be functions of neurobiological
processes.
Just like these other examples of reduction, whether probability is thus ex-
plained, or explained away, it can no longer be viewed as fundamental. It can
only have the status of the branching structure itself; it is ‘emergent’. Chance,
like quasiclassicality, is then an ‘effective’ concept, its meaning at the micro-
scopic level entirely derivative on the establishment of correlations, natural or
man-made, with macroscopic branching. That doesn’t mean amplitudes in gen-
eral (and other relations in the Hilbert space norm) have no place in the foun-
dations of EQM – on the contrary, they are part of the fundamental ontology –
but their link to probability is indirect. It is simply a mistake, if this reduction
is successful, to see quantum theory as at bottom a theory of probability.
1 Explaining probability
Functional reduction is not new to the sciences; functional reduction, specifi-
cally, of probability, is not new to philosophy. In any moderately serious form of
physical realism a world is a system of actual events, arranged in a spatiotempo-
ral array, defined in terms of objective, physical properties and relations alone.
Where in all this are the physical probabilities? For physicalists, they can only
be grounded on the actual structure of events - what Lewis has called a ‘Humean
tapestry’ of events (Lewis [1986a xv-xvi]), whereupon the same identificatory
project ensues as in EQM2. The links (i), (ii), (iii) stand in need of explana-
tion whatever the physics, classical or quantum, one world or many. For the
most part they have remained surprisingly hard to explain, even, and perhaps
especially, in one-world theories.3
2Lewis explicitly contemplated extending his ‘tapestry of events’ to quantum mechanics,
acknowledging that novel quantum properties and relations (like amplitudes and relations
among amplitudes) may have to be included; but only come the day that quantum mechanics
is ‘purified’ (Lewis [1986a p.xi]) – ‘of instrumental frivolity, of doublethinking deviant logic,
and – most of all – of supernatural tales about the power of the observant mind to make
things jump’. Quantum mechanics has certainly been purified in EQM.
3According to even so committed an empiricist as B. van Fraassen, a model of a probabilistic
physical theory must include elements representing alternative possible sequences of outcomes,
and the theory can be true ‘only if alternative possible courses of events are real.’ (van Fraassen
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But one of the three links, in the case of one-world theories, is easily ex-
plained – namely (iii), the link with uncertainty. Only allow that the dynamics
is indeterministic (whether in a fundamental or effective sense), so that some
kinds of events in the future are (at least effectively) unpredictable, then, for
the denizens of that world, the future will in some respects at least be uncertain.
This is how all the conventional theories of chance explain (iii) (with varying
strengths of ‘unpredictability’). But according to EQM all outcomes exist, and,
we may as well suppose, are known to exist (we may suppose we know the rel-
evant branching structure of the wave-function) – so the future is completely
known. There is no uncertainty on this score.
This marks out EQM as facing a particular difficulty with (iii), the link
with uncertainty, a difficulty encountered by none of the familiar theories of
probability in physics. It has seemed so severe, in fact, that not only do the
majority of critics of EQM believe that as a theory of probability it must rest on
the links (i) with statistics and (ii) rationality alone (if it is to mean anything),
but so do many of its friends.4 The attempt to ground EQM on (i) and (ii) alone,
disavowing all talk of probability or uncertainty, has been dubbed the fission
programme. This article is intended as a counterbalance, and is skewed towards a
defense of (iii), the link with uncertainty. As I shall argue in Section 3 and 4, the
status of this link is not in fact so different in EQM than in conventional theories
of chance, using a possible-worlds analysis, of a sort familiar to philosophers.
I have less to say on (i) and (ii), not because they are less important to
the overall argument, but because arguments for them are either well-known
(in the case of (i), the link with statistics) or given elsewhere in this volume
(by Wallace, for (ii), the principal principle). Both links now appear to be in
significantly better shape in EQM than in the other main theories of physical
probability (classical statistical mechanics, deterministic hidden variable theo-
ries, and stochastic physical theories), none of which offer comparably detailed
explanations of (i) and (ii). Instead they presuppose them.
First (i), the link with statistics. A first step was the demonstration that a
largely formal condition of adequacy could be met: a quantum version of the
Bernouilli (‘law of large numbers’) theorem could be derived5. This says that
in the limit of large numbers of trials, the probability of relative frequencies
different from the predicted probabilities goes to zero. But this theorem follows
from the rules of probability. Distinctive, in EQM, is that given an account
of what chance processes /textitactually are (branchings), and given that in
EQM we can model any measurement process as comprehensively as we please
(including ‘the observer’ if need be) it becomes a purely dynamical question
as to whether and how branch amplitudes can be measured. I will give some
illustrative examples in Section 2 – but I take these arguments to be relatively
uncontroversial.
Not so the arguments for (ii), the decision theory link. But even here, few
would deny that there has been progress – and on two quite separate fronts,
[1980 p.197]).
4E.g. Papineau, [1996, 2010], Greaves [2004], [2007], Deutsch [1999, 2010].
5As first sketched by Everett in the ‘long dissertation’ (Everett [1973]).
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both involving the principal principle: the first (the sense already suggested)
in showing why credence should track chance, as identified in our Everettian
tapestry; the second in showing how we could have been led, by rational, em-
pirical methods, to anything like that tapestry in the first place.
For the former argument, see Wallace [2010, 2012], deriving the principal
principle.6 He shows that branching structures and the squared moduli of the
amplitudes, insofar as they are known, ought to play the same decision theory
role (ii) that chances play, insofar as they are known, in one-world theories.
Whatever one might think of Wallace’s axioms, as long as nothing underhand
or sneaky is going on the result is already a milestone: nothing comparable has
been achieved for any other physical theory of chance.
It is, however, limited to the context of agents who believe the world has the
branching structure EQM says it has – it is a solution to the ‘practical prob-
lem’, the normative problem of how agents who believe they live in a branching
universe ought to achieve their ends (without any prior assumption about prob-
ability). It has no direct role in confirming or disconfirming EQM as one of
a number of rival physical theories by agents uncommitted as to its truth. It
leaves the ‘evidential problem’ unsolved.
But on this front too there has been progress. Greaves [2007] and Greaves
and Myrvold [2010] showed how confirmation theory (specifically Bayesian con-
firmation theory) can be generalized so as to apply to branching theories and
non-branching theories evenhandedly, without empirical prejudice. The latter
proved a representation theorem on the basis of axioms that are entirely inde-
pendent of quantum mechanics. Nor, in keeping with the fission programme,
do they make explicit or even tacit appeal to the notion of probability or un-
certainty.
Wallace’s axioms were likewise intended to apply even in the context of the
fission programme. If acceptable that shows the argument for (ii) is independent
of (iii). But if the argument for (iii) (with (i) and (ii)) goes through, then the
present approach also promises a solution to the evidential problem. As an
objection to the Everett interpretation, the problem only arises if it is granted
that branching and branch amplitudes cannot be identified with chance and
probabilities (which we take to mean are not in fact quantities that satisfy (i),
(ii), (iii)), precisely the point here in contention. Show that they can, and the
evidential problem simply dissolves. Or rather, since it can be read as a problem
for every chance theory, it will have the same status in the Everett interpretation
as it has in any other physical theory of chance, to all of which the Greaves and
Myrvold analysis applies.
I have little more to say about (ii), the decision-theory link. What follows is
6Note added Sep 2016. This is the principal principle in the special instance of EQM.
Wallace speaks instead of ‘deriving the Born rule’, but of couse there are many derivations
of the Born rule (that have nothing to do with decision theory): of which Everett [1957] was
the first. See e.g. Zurek [2005], for a derivation from locality, or Saunders [2004, 2005], for
a derivation from operational and invariance principles respectively; Another notable [and
greatly neglected] derivation was given by Lubkin [1979] (my thanks to Ted Jacobson for
pointing this out to me.
4
directed to (i), the link with statistics (Section 2), but mainly to (iii), the link
with uncertainty.7
In Section 3 I show how branching in EQM is consistent with talk of uncer-
tainty (following Saunders and Wallace [2008a]). That is arguably enough, with
the results of Section 2 and in decision theory, to draw our main conclusion:
branching in EQM should be identified with chancing, and mod-squared branch
amplitudes with chance.
But there remains a contrary reading, according to which there is no place
for uncertainty after all – or not of the right kind. Given sufficient knowledge
of the wave-function, on this contrary reading uncertainty can at best concern
present states of affairs, not future ones. In the final and more philosophical
section I argue that the difference boils down to a choice of metaphysics, a
choice that is under-determined by the mathematical structure of the theory.
Since choices like this should be made to help in the understanding of a physical
theory, rather than to frustrate it, the contrary reading should be rejected.
2 Why chance is measured by statistics
Here are a number of no-go facts about how physical probabilities are observed
that we believe to be true, but that seem very difficult to explain on any con-
ventional theory of physical probability:
(a) There is no probability meter that can measure single-case chance with
chance equal to one.
(b) There is no probability meter that can measure chance on repeated trials
with chance equal to one.
(c) There is no probability meter that can measure single-case chance with
chance close to one.
(d) Absolute probability can never be measured, only relative probability.
(The list could be continued.)
On conventional thinking, someone who needs convincing of these facts about
chance has not so much failed to understood a physical theory as the concept of
probability. But if chance is a definite physical magnitude, it should (at least
indirectly) be measurable, like anything else. Given the dynamics, and a theory
complete enough to model the experimental process itself, these facts should
be explained. And indeed no non-trivial function of the branch amplitudes can
be measured in the ways mentioned in (a)-(d), according to EQM. This is a
dynamical claim.
On the positive side, as to how (we know) chances are in practice measured:
7Note added Sep 2016. Of Wallace’s axioms, ‘branching indifference’ (that branching per
se, where the differences between branches do not matter, should be treated as irrelevant) has
been thought particularly vulnerable. But if uncertainty is the right attitude in the face of
branching, then I should be indifferent as to which of a number of persons is me, if they differ
only in ways that do not matter to me. See Wilson [2011], [2013].
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(e) There are probability meters that measure chances on repeated trials (per-
haps simultaneous trials) with chance close to one.
This is conventionally thought of as a consequence of the axioms of probability
(the law of large numbers, or Bernouilli theorem) rather than of any physical
theory; in turning it around, and deriving it rather from the dynamical equations
of EQM, it identifies the appropriate physical quantities that are to count as
probabilities instead.
There remains one other obvious fact without which one might well think
no account of chance can so much as get off the ground: chance outcomes are
typically mutually exclusive or incompatible – in which case only one outcome
obtains (which one happens by chance). That is (where I explicitly add the
qualification ‘observable’, as we are concerned with how chances can be mea-
sured):
Presupposition: Of two incompatible, observable, chance events,
only one event happens
How can the presupposition be explained in EQM? In comparison with (a)-
(e) it seems to have the least to do with chance – the word ‘chance’ could be
deleted from it entirely – but we surely do talk about chance in this way. It is
presupposed by any application of the concept of chance that (at least some-
times) chances apply to incompatible outcomes. The concept of incompatibility
enters at the the very beginning of any mathematical definition of a probability
measure on a space of events (events are represented by sets, and inherit from
set theory the structure of a Boolean algebra). And yet it seems to be vio-
lated straightforwardly in EQM, as Everett’s crazy idea was that in a quantum
measurement all outcomes happen.
If that was all there was to it it would be hard to understand why EQM
was ever taken seriously by anyone. The answer is that the presupposition has
two different readings, the one a physical or metaphysical claim – about what
chances fundamentally are – and the other a claim about what is observable (by
any observer), the phenomenology of chance.
On the first reading, the presupposition is straightforwardly denied; it is de-
nied if the word ‘chance’ is deleted too. But we already knew this: this is simply
a conflict between a many-worlds and a one-world theory. Likewise for the pre-
supposition as a metaphysical claim: we already knew EQM challenges a number
of a priori claims. It is only as an epistemological claim – as to the observed
phenomenology – that the presupposition had better still make sense. But so it
does: EQM explains it very simply. No two incompatible chance outcomes can
happen in the same branch. And since the apparatus, and the observer, and the
entire observable universe, are branch-relative – they are ‘in-branch’ structures
– no observer can ever witness incompatible outcomes simultaneously.8 In this
8If this is thought to be question-begging: there does not exist a perception of two in-
compatible outcomes, according to EQM, treating perception biochemically, or indeed as any
kind of record-making process. (This point goes back to Everett [1957] and, ultimately, the
von Neumann model of measurement. See also Gell-Mann and Hartle [1990] and Saunders
[1994].)
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second sense, then, the presupposition is rather elegantly dealt with in EQM –
‘elegantly’, because it follows directly from its account of what a chance set-up
is, and from what chance is (one should not delete the word ‘chance’ !).
The other everyday (‘no-go’) facts about probabilities follow, not from branch-
ing alone, but from the unitarity of the equations of motion. Because I do not
think this claim is particularly controversial I will simply illustrate it with a
proof of (a), for relative probabilities (meaning a quantity that concerns the
relationships between chancy outcomes).Consider then a microscopic system in
the state
|ϕc〉 = c|ϕ+〉+
√
1− |c|2|ϕ−〉.
For simplicity, model the measurement process as a 1-step history, using the
Schro¨dinger picture, with initial state |ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 at t = 0 where |ω〉 is the
state of the rest of the universe. Let the configuration describing (among other
things) the apparatus registering (a function of) the amplitude c at time t be
α(c). Let the projection onto this configuration be Pα(c) and let the associated
Heisenberg-picture projection be
Pα(c)(t) = e
iHt/~Pα(c)e
−iHt/~
(See appendix 1 for how quantum histories are defined as time-ordered products
of such projectors.) The no-go fact we need to establish is that there is no
unitary dynamics Ut = e
−iHt/~ by means of which:
|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 → Ut|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 = UtPα(c)(t)|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉
for variable c. If there were it would also follow that for c′ 6= c:
|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc′〉 → UtPα(c′)(t)|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc′〉.
But the inner product of the LHS of the two initial states can be as close to
one as desired, whilst that of the vectors on the RHS must be zero, as α(c) and
α(c′) must differ macroscopically for sufficiently large |c − c′|, a contradiction.
Thus not even relative probabilities can be measured deterministically. (The
argument for absolute probabilities is even simpler, and depends only on the
linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation.)
Now for (e), how (relative) chances can be measured according to EQM, with
high chance. Take a number N of subsystems, each (to a good approximation)
in state ϕc = cϕ+ +
√
1− |c|2ϕ−, and arrange the linear dynamics so that
|ω ⊗ ϕ±〉 → UtPα(±)(t)|ω ⊗ ϕ±〉 (1)
i.e. the von Neumann model of measurement, where α(+) is a configuration in
which the apparatus reads ‘spin up’ and α(−) ‘spin down’. Applied to an initial
state of the form |ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉, it yields the superposition
|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 → UtPα(+)(t)|ω ⊗ ϕc〉+ UtPα(−)(t)|ω ⊗ ϕc〉
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in which the first vector has norm |c| and the second has norm √1− |c|2. That
is, the amplitudes c,
√
1− |c|2 of components in a microscopic superposition
have been promoted to macroscopic branch amplitudes. Consider now repeated
measurements of N microscopic systems all in the same state |ϕc〉, whether
sequentially repeated in time, or measured all at once. The latter is the simplest
to model, assuming the N apparatuses are non-interacting: the result at time t
will be a superposition of vectors at t of the form
|αf (t)〉 = UtPf(1)(t)⊗ ...⊗ Pf(N)(t)|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ϕc〉
where f(k), k = 1, ..., N is either +1 or -1. Those with the same relative
frequencies M/N will all have the same norm, i.e.:
||αf , t〉| = |c|M
√
(1− |c|2)N−M ;
N∑
k=1
f(k) = 2M −N. (2)
The unitary evolution to time t is:
|ω〉 ⊗ |ϕc〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ϕc〉 →
N∑
M=0
 ∑
f ; ΣNk=1f(k)=2M−N
|αf , t〉
 . (3)
The right-most summation, for fixed M,N , is over all N !/M !(N −M)! distinct
f ’s, all with the same norm Eq.(2). Since 〈αf , t |αg, t〉 = 0 for f 6= g,9 the
squared norm of the RHS of Eq.(3) is
N∑
M=0
N !
M !(N −M)! ||αf , t〉|
2
=
N∑
M=0
x(M)
where x(M) is:
x(M) = |c|2M (1− |c|2)N−M N !
M !(N −M)! .
For N large, this function is strongly peaked about M/N = |c|2 . The sum of
norms of vectors with the ‘right’ relative frequency is much larger than the sum
of norms of vectors with the ‘wrong’ relative frequency. In this sense measured
relative frequencies close to |c|2 are found on relatively high amplitude branches.
It was rather crucial to this argument that we consider only relative fre-
quency – we don’t care about precisely which particles were recorded as ‘spin-
up’ and ‘spin-down’ (or which of our N−apparatuses recorded which result).
That is, our measurement protocol requires that the measurements be treated
as ‘exchangeable’, in de Finetti’s sense (Greaves and Myrvold [2010 pp.277-80]).
This is an axiom of de Finetti’s approach, whereas in EQM it is explained.
9For sequences of measurements in time, the consistency condition is needed at this point:
see appendix 1.
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Might some other method be found by which functions of amplitudes may be
measured, flouting (a)-(d)? Perhaps;10 but that is unlikely to make for objection
if, like EQM, it is based on the unitary formalism of quantum mechanics. If
based on a rival theory, which is empirically successful, that will anyway spell
the end of quantum mechanics (and with it EQM).
Now suppose, fancifully if you will, that we are entitled to identify chances
with functions of branch amplitudes. Then in summary we have just shown:
chances will generally be associated with incompatible observable outcomes,
only one of which can happen at each time; they may not be measured in a way
that is not itself chancy, and single-case chance cannot be measured at all. They
can only be measured by running a chance (branching) process repeatedly, or by
a single trial involving a large number of similarly prepared systems, and listing
the relative frequencies (taking care to neglect the order of outcomes, or which
system had which outcome). The measurement will be veridical, however, only
with high chance, given the number of systems involved is sufficiently large.
None of these facts can be explained by any conventional physical theory of
probability (rather, they are presupposed).
3 Why chance involves uncertainty
We cannot, however, identify chance set-ups with branch set-ups, and chances
with functions of amplitudes, failing an account of (iii), the link with uncertainty.
In the absence of this, to arrive, by the Deutsch-Wallace representation theorem,
at an agent’s credence function (in conformity with the Born rule), raises a
puzzle on its own. For what does a rational agent believe to some degree when
she uses that credence function? Given the theorem, certainly we can explain
credence by reference to behaviour; but in this case, better, perhaps, to simply
explain it away. A rational agent must order her priorities somehow, whether
or not there is anything of which she is uncertain; but it is hard to see how
is it possible to have degrees of belief different from one and zero if you know
everything there is to know.
The functionalists’ response is to more or less recapitulate the representation
theorem: credences derive their meaning from their function in rational action,
in determining expected utilities, and hence agents’ preferences. They will also
note that meaning is determined by use – that if anything has been agreed by
philosophers of language in recent decades it is:
Words have no function save as they play a role in sentences: their
semantic features are abstracted from the semantic features of sen-
tences, just as the semantic features of sentences are abstracted
from their part in helping people achieve goals or realize intentions.
(Davidson [2001, p. 220])
10For example, ‘protective measurements’ (Aharonov and Vaidman [1993]), although see
the criticism of Uffink [2000]); or ‘weak measurements’ (Aharonov et al [1988]).
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So there is every reason to talk of expected utilities and credences. By the
same broadly functionalist philosophy, if these credences play the same role that
credences about chance events play, they are credences about chance events.
Talk of uncertainty and unpredictability then falls into place along with the
rest of our ordinary use of words.
I think this argument is essentially correct, but it leaves unanswered – brief
explanations please! – just how talk of uncertainty is to fall into place, and just
what to say in answer to the question of what these degrees of belief are about.
First a warm-up. In the previous section I argued that functions of branch
amplitudes are measured – they are manifested in-branch – in just the way that
chances are measured. A part of that argument was that the presupposition
about incompatible outcomes follows (rather straightforwardly) from EQM: on
each trial, since macroscopically distinct, only one outcome can be obtained in
each branch. So from the point of view of accumulating information that can ac-
tually be used – ‘in-branch’ information – events are registered sequentially, just
as they are in a non-branching theory. This was what Everett [1957] took pains
to show. But isn’t sequential increase in information increase in knowledge? So
isn’t there something that is being learned in each branch?
Consider a concrete example. Alice, we suppose, is about to perform a Stern-
Gerlach experiment. She understands the structure of the apparatus and the
state preparation device, and she is convinced EQM is true. In what sense does
she learn, post-branching, something new? The answer is that each Alice, post-
branching, learns something new (or is in a position to learn something new) –
each will say something (namely, ‘I see the outcome is spin-up (respectively, spin-
down), and not spin-down (respectively, spin-up)’) that Alice prior to branching
cannot say. It is true that Alice, prior to branching knows that this is what each
successor will say – but still she herself cannot speak in this way.
To make this vivid, imagine that each of her successors simply closes her
eyes, when the result is obtained; in that state, each is genuinely ignorant of the
result (so-called ‘Vaidman ignorance’; Vaidman [1998]). This has usually been
considered (by Vaidman himself) as ignorance that Alice, prior to branching,
does not have, but it can be turned around the other way: each Alice, closing
her eyes, perpetuates a state of ignorance that she already had.
The implication of this line of thought11 is that appearances notwithstand-
ing, prior to branching Alice does not know everything there is to know. What
is it she does not know? I say ‘appearances notwithstanding’, for of course
in one sense (we may suppose) Alice does know everything there is to know;
she knows (we might as well assume) the entire corpus of impersonal, scientific
knowledge. But what that does not tell her is just which person she is – or
where she is located – in the wave-function of the universe.
The point is a familiar one to philosophers. One can know that there are
such-and-such people, but not which one of them is me. Or that such-and-such
events occur at various places, but not which of those places is here; or times,
but not which of those times is now.
11Picked up also by Ismael [2003], although she develops it in a rather different way.
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Such knowledge that is omitted is sometimes called ‘indexical’ knowledge, by
philosophers, also ‘knowledge de se’, and ‘self-locating knowledge’ (we shall use
the latter). But why should knowledge like this be lacking? Vaidman has Alice
hide her eyes. Another example, due to J. R. Perry, likewise suggests some kind
of impairment is needed. Perry asks us to consider an amnesiac who has lost his
way in the library at Stanford. He does not know who he is; he does not know
where he is – not even were he to read every book in the library, not even if he
were to read his own biography, would he be any the wiser. But Alice is not so
impaired. She does not hide her eyes, and no more is she an amnesiac. She sees
where she is in the wave-function of the universe and self-locates accordingly –
and differently – from where her successors locate themselves, for, obviously, she
is at a different place from them. She is not ignorant of anything her successors
know; she simply reports different self-locating facts from them.
And so she would, but only given certain assumptions as to what, exactly,
she is – of how she is represented in the physics. For example, if she at tj is
represented by the configuration βj , or by the Heisenberg-picture vector |βj〉 =
Pβj (tj)|Ω〉, where |Ω〉 is the universal state, with her successors at tk > tj
similarly represented by configurations βk, β
′
k, or vectors |βk〉, |β′k〉, the result
surely follows. But this treats her as strictly a momentary thing, independent
of the history in which she is located. There is an alternative: if she at tj is
represented instead by an entire history β, indexed by tj , then of course, at tj ,
she does not know which history or branch vector is hers, and quite the opposite
result follows.
Which of the two is correct? But questions like these (or rather their classical
counterparts) are well known in metaphysics (and specifically personal identity).
Most philosophers are agreed they cannot be settled on the basis of the physics
alone. Here then is a metaphysics friendly to the Everett interpretation: let
persons be spacetime worldtubes from cradle to grave (in the jargon, ‘maximal
continuants’). If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even
prior to branching at tj , that there are many Alice’s present, atom-for-atom
duplicates up to tj , each behaving in exactly the same way and saying just
the same words. If that is the right metaphysical picture for EQM, then Alice
should be uncertain after all – each Alice should be uncertain – for each as of tj
does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching
persons is she.
That, I take it, establishes that the question of whether or not there is
uncertainty in the Everett interpretation can be settled either way, depending
on a metaphysics of personal identity. But rather than invoke a metaphysical
assumption, we can make do with a different kind of claim – a proposal, not
about the ultimate natures of persons, but about the reference of the word
‘person’ in EQM terms. The proposal is that talk of persons (and things) be
relativized as to branch:12
S1 By a ’person’ or ‘thing’ is meant a branch-part or ordered pair (β,|α〉), where
12This semantics was discussed briefly in Wallace [2005], [2006] and in more detail in Saun-
ders and Wallace [2008a], on which the argument that follows is based.
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α ∈ β.
Here ‘α ∈ β’ means the sequence of configurations β is obtained by a coarse-
graining of α, which we suppose is temporally and spatially much more finely
grained. Likewise ‘a person at time tj ’ is represented by an ordered triple
(βj , β, |α〉) (if a person is an entire history), where α ∈ β ∈ βj , or by an
ordered pair (βj ,|α〉) (if a person is a stage). More is needed for tensed sentences
(involving ‘was’, ‘is’, ‘will be’ etc.), but for this, and on the question of how S1
can be justified, see Section 4.
For now note S1’s virtues. First, it is clearly permissible; it makes use of
nothing but the available mathematics of EQM in terms of branch vectors |α〉
and sequences of configurations α, β etc., as ordered pairs {(β, |α〉); α ∈ β}.13.
True, this requires the consistent histories formalism, in which branch vectors
are Heisenberg-picture vectors (so that a branch vector |α〉 describes the entire
history α, not any particular instant of it). The perspective is atemporal. But
branching itself is a process defined by the dynamics over time: the idea of
a decoherence basis, defined at an instant of time independent of what comes
before and what comes after, is a fiction.
Second, using S1, not only is Alice entitled – bound – to be unsure of the
outcome of the experiment, but she has a genuine gain in knowledge when it is
learned. For after branching, using S1, on observing the outcome, each Alice
self-locates better than she did before – knows more than she did before – and
so has learned something that, prior to branching, she could not have known.
Vaidman’s ignorance is ignorance each Alice already had. Likewise, there can
be no algorithm, whose input is data about a branch up to one time, and whose
output uniquely specifies that branch at a later time; for the same algorithm
must operate in every other branch which is exactly the same up to that time
but which differs thereafter. Branching events are algorithmically uncertain too
– they are indeterministic.
Third, S1 is neutral on some (but not all) metaphysical questions about
personal identity. Specifically, those that arise given 4−dimensionalism, assum-
ing a single world, are likely to play out the same under S1, in the context of
branching worlds, if only it is permitted to relativize one’s favoured candidate
for β to worlds (represented by Heisenberg-picture branch vectors |α〉, where
α ∈ β).
And the bottom line: under S1, prior to branching, uncertainty is assured:
Alice doesn’t know if she will see spin-down or spin-up, as she doesn’t know
which branch she is in. Unless some hidden contradiction is involved, S1 is the
right rule for making sense of quantum mechanics in realist terms.
Conclusion. Branching, the development of superpositions of the universal
state with respect to the decoherence basis, plays all the chance roles (i), (ii),
(iii): it produces the same phenomenology as chance, the squared norms of
branch amplitudes are of practical relevance to decision theory in the way
that chances normally are, and using SI, branching involves uncertainty, just
13Contrary to Kent [2010 p.346].
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as chances do. In EQM, branching and squared norms of branch amplitudes are
demonstrably functionally equivalent to chance, in these three central respects;
therefore they are chance processes, and chances are these physical magnitudes.
4 Overlap and divergence
There are alternatives to the rule S1, however. Invoking it seems to compromise
a chief selling point of the Everett interpretation, which is that many worlds
follows from the unitary dynamics, with no added principles or special assump-
tions. That is what puts the Everett interpretation in a class of its own when it
comes to the quantum realism problem: there are plenty of avenues for obtain-
ing (at least non-relativistic) one-world theories if we are prepared to violate
this precept.
On the other hand S1 is on the face of it just a semantic rule – it is merely
a linguistic matter. The referents of terms are constrained by their contexts of
use, granted; but over and above those constraints, not even in the God’s eye
view is their meaning determined. It is up to us to say what, precisely, among
the structures in the universal state, our words really mean. And if that is all
there is to uncertainty, nothing much should hang on the matter either way.
The challenge remains: to justify the probability interpretation of EQM on the
grounds of (i) and (ii) alone.
I think there is something right about this argument. Whether or not there is
genuine uncertainty in the Everett interpretation appears rather less substantive
than might have been thought. But in that case, let satisfaction of the chance
roles (i) and (ii) be enough to count for branching to count as chance; our
conclusion stands.14
But on three counts this would be too quick. The first is that for many,
S1 really is a metaphysical claim, for all my talk of semantics – and that there
is a substantive question of whether it is true. Certainly there are alternative
metaphysical claims that could be made that cause problems to S1. I shall
have something to say about this sort of argument, but not much: for I do
not believe there are metaphysical truths of this sort, independent of ordinary
language and natural science. Or let me put the point more constructively:
metaphysics should primarily be answerable to language and to science; it should
be ‘naturalized’ (Saunders [1997], Ladyman and Ross [2007]). If this is right S1
may still be a metaphysical claim, a claim of substance, but in the naturalized
sense.
The second count is that we should take rather more seriously the task of
accounting for language use, for that too is emergent structure, a part of the
physical world to be studied as such by scientific means. As with any form of
functional reduction, we know what we are looking for in advance: the problem
is to identify the right sort of structure at the more fundamental physical level
to account for phenomena that we are already familiar with at the less. Devising
14This is not the fission programme, which would have us renounce talk of objective chance
and genuine probability (along with uncertainty).
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semantic rules, whose truth conditions are fixed by reference to the underlying
theory, is only a variation on the same procedure – it is reductionism as it is
appropriate to linguistics. It is no different in kind from fixing on certain vari-
ables, for example hydrodynamical variables, in decoherence theory, to derive
quasiclassicality. Sure, there remain the wrong variables, ones that give no hint
of classicality; and wrong semantic rules too, which are inadequate to explaining
our linguistic behaviour – and which give no hint of uncertainty. They should
be eschewed.
This argument is a variant of Wallace’s [2005], which puts the matter in
terms of ‘the principle of charity’. This principle says that the most important
criterion of ‘good’ translation, in the radical case, where no prior standard of
translation has been established, is that it maximizes truth. Working out what
to say about branching, if EQM is true, is like radical translation – of how to
translate into our own tongue the expressions of some alien language on the
basis of observable linguistic behaviour alone. If EQM is true, it has always
been true, and we have always used words like ‘uncertainty’ and ‘chance’ in the
context of branching so – like it or not! – that is what those words have always
been about. Whatever we might say about novel scenarios like teleportation
machines or brain transplants (the ways in which philosophers have tended to
imagine persons being divided) our use of words in ordinary contexts is not
in doubt. The referents of ordinary words and truth conditions of everyday
sentences (as specified in a physical theory) may wait to be correctly identified,
but the criteria for ‘correctness’ is decided, not by metaphysics, but by their
adequacy, as follows from the theory, to make sense of what we ordinarily say.
Greaves herself accepts this argument (Greaves [2007 p.124]), but not all
Everettians do, and surely not all skeptics of EQM do. But this dispute is
independent of EQM per se. It should be settled if possible by some other
example of the general method – say, in the arena of a semantics for temporal
affairs, involving tense and becoming, in classical spacetime theories (as argued
by Saunders [1996], Wallace [2005]), or in the arena of a semantics for agency,
moral responsibility, and free-will, in deterministic theories.
The third count on which the case for uncertainty can be too quickly deflated
is a strengthened version of the first. I have already hinted at it: maybe S1 does
harbour some hidden contradiction, or some failure of integrity more broadly
construed. The semantics should not misrepresent our situation, were EQM
true.
This, it seems to me, is the only serious concern, and the only one I shall
consider in the rest of this chapter. But it needs explaining. The very worry
seems strange. How can a sentence misrepresent a theory, if it is true by that
very theory?
Some more detail on the semantics will be helpful15. Let α = 〈α+, .., α−〉,
where t+ is much later than any time we are interested in, and t− is much
earlier. Call branches like this maximal. By ‘world’ I mean maximal branches,
15Other rules may be possible as well: see Wallace [2006] for some alternatives. The rules
that follow are illustrative.
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represented by maximal branch vectors. Let F be true of some branches, false
of others. Then since, by S1, speakers and things are parts of branches, so are
utterances:
S2 An utterance of ‘F ’ in branch |α〉 is true if and only if F is true in α.
Now for tensed statements. Let α+(t) =
def
〈α+, .., αk〉 3 α, tk > t ≥ tk−1 be the
future of α at t; let α−(t) =
def
〈αk, .., α−〉 3 α, tk+1 > t ≥ tk be the past of α at
t. Let F be true at some times, false at others (it is an ‘occasion sentence’, in
Quinean terms). The rule for future physical contingencies is:
S3 An utterance of ‘F will be the case’ in branch |α〉 at t is true if and only if
F is true in the future of α at t.
A first stab at a rule for future possibilities is:
S4 An utterance of ‘F might happen’ in branch |α〉 at t is true if and only if
for some branch |α′〉, F is true in the future of α′ at t, where the past of
α′ and α at t is the same.
But the latter will obviously need to be restricted to branches vectors |α′〉 whose
norm, conditional on α−(t), is non-negligible (or else it will turn out that pretty
well anything might happen). And similarly for counterfactuals.
S2 and S3, fairly obviously, satisfy the principle of charity. S4 promises to,
at least if ‘might happen’ is taken to mean ‘might happen by chance’ – that is, in
accordance with the laws of quantum mechanics. Apart from this proviso, it fits
well enough with standard ideas in modal metaphysics. One has only to replace
‘branch |α〉’ by ‘possible world’ and the ‘sameness of the past’ relation entering
in S4 by a ‘nearest counterpart’ relation (Lewis [1973]) – although philosophers
typically are interested in a notion of possibility of much broader scope.
Now notice that the ‘sameness of the past’ relation is neutral on the question
of whether, in the past, (maximal) branches (or rather spatiotemporal parts of
such branches) are numerically the same, or only qualitatively the same. They
are neutral on the question of whether (to use a technical term in philosophy)
they ‘overlap’ or merely ‘diverge’. But this difference is crucial, say metaphysi-
cians. Rules like S1− S4 have been offered by philosophers (almost always) as
a semantics for the latter sort, for ‘diverging’ worlds, not for the former – or, as
philosophers also call overlapping worlds, ‘branching’ worlds.
Which is it, in EQM? This question is in danger of being settled on the
basis of an accident of terminology. Let us agree that ‘branching’ means the
development of superpositions with respect to the decoherence basis. For the
sense intended by philosophers – where there are numerical identities among
spatiotemporal parts – we will speak of ‘overlap’. Mundane examples of overlap
are everywhere. Thus roads overlap if they share the same stretch of asphalt;
houses and roofs, cars and steering wheels, hands and fingers, all overlap. Over-
lapping, like Everettian branching, supposedly has a formal definition too, but
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not in terms of Hilbert space structure. Rather, it is defined in terms of ‘mereol-
ogy’, the general theory of parts and wholes. (I shall come back to this shortly.)
As for ‘divergence’, its definition is more equivocal. It is sometimes used
to mean that there exist no physical relations between worlds, contrary to the
situation for worlds in EQM16, but we shall take it as simply the opposite of
overlap: ‘diverging’ means ‘non-overlapping’.
Now to the point: if worlds overlap in EQM then (definitionally) there are
genuine transworld identities. The very same thing exists in different worlds.
In particular, since branching is massive in EQM, if worlds overlap then the
very same person is part of vast numbers of worlds, differing, perhaps, only in
respects remote in space and time – differing, maybe, only after centuries. All
this is contrary to S1. In that case any uncertainty to be had can have nothing
to do with a metaphysics of personal identity. But is there any uncertainty to
be had?
The worry is not that overlapping worlds are unintelligible or inconsistent;
it is that they make nonsense of ordinary beliefs. As Lewis put it17:
Respect for common sense gives us reason to reject any theory that
says that we ourselves are involved in branching [overlapping].... But
we needn’t reject the very possibility that a world branches [over-
laps]. The unfortunate inhabitants of such a world, if they think of
‘the future’ as we do, are of course sorely deceived, and their peculiar
circumstances do make nonsense of how they ordinarily think. But
that is their problem; not ours, as it would be if the worlds generally
branched [overlapped] rather than diverging. (Lewis [1986b p.209].)
Diverging worlds, composed of objects and events that do not overlap (that are
qualitatively but not numerically identical) do not suffer from this problem.
Of course ‘common sense’ does not cut it much in the physical sciences; and
Lewis’ final sentence could not more comprehensively beg the question. But
let us grant this much: he who believes he is contained in each of a number of
worlds cannot also wonder which of them he’s in.
We are at the nub of the matter: do worlds – maximal branches, sequences
of relative configurations of particles and fields, as described by EQM – overlap
in the philosophers’ sense, or do they diverge?
We should discount two considerations. First, the coincidence in the termi-
nology ‘branching’ (because as introduced by Everett, it referred to the math-
ematical formalism of quantum mechanics, not to the philosophers’ criterion
of overlap). Second, the fact that worlds in EQM do not diverge in the sense
16This can cause some confusion, evident in Saunders [1998 Sec.5], where I erroneously
said that ‘fatalism’ (a near-neighbour to the position I am currently defending) involved the
replacement of the superposition of histories (the universal state) by an incoherent mixture
of histories, and must thus be rejected.
17Not everyone agrees with Lewis on this point. Thus Johnston [1989] suggested the rule
S3 in the explicit context of overlapping persons, arguing that semantic rules like this were
underdetermined by the metaphysics.
16
of being physically disconnected (they are not physically disconnected, because
they superpose, but the issue is whether or not they overlap).
Their remains another consideration, however. There is a clear parallel with
simultaneous rather than temporal overlap. For (ignoring entanglement) let the
Schro¨dinger-picture state of a composite system of observer and environment at
time t be
|ψ(t)〉 ⊗ (c|χ(t)〉+ c′|χ′(t)〉) (4)
where |ψ(t)〉is the state of the observer, and c|χ(t)〉+ c′|χ′(t)〉 is the state of the
environment, a superposition of macroscopically distinct states |χ(t)〉, |χ′(t)〉.
Perhaps the latter only differ with respect to macroscopic objects at enormously
large spacelike distances – say, a radioactive decay that triggers a macroscopi-
cally significant event on a planetary system in the far side of Andromeda. In
such a case, it is not at all obvious that the observer should be uncertain as to
which branch, |ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |χ(t)〉 or |ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |χ′(t)〉, she belongs. Her relative state
in Everett’s sense is the superposition c|χ(t)〉+ c′|χ′(t)〉; in this there is no hint
of uncertainty.
True enough, but for the mathematical identity:
|ψ(t)〉 ⊗ (c|χ(t)〉+ c′|χ′(t)〉) = c|ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |χ(t)〉+ c′|ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |χ′(t)〉.
We can read the relativization the other way: of the observer |ψ(t)〉 relative to
the environment |χ(t)〉 with amplitude c, and of another observer |ψ(t)〉 relative
to the environment |χ′(t)〉 with amplitude c′. It cannot be necessary to count the
two observers as numerically the same, without further assumptions. Suppose,
for example, they have their amplitudes as properties; if c 6= c′ they are not
even qualitatively the same.
Pursuit of the question of quantum non-locality leads on to relativity, where
it connects with ordinary beliefs about probability in much the same way that
the relativity of simultaneity connects with ordinary beliefs about tense (Saun-
ders [1995, 1996]). Here we shall stick to probability as it applies to events
related by unambiguously timelike relations, as it figures in our practical lives.
What is needed is an atemporal perspective. That takes us to the quantum
histories formalism: how does the distinction between overlap and divergence
play out in the Heisenberg picture?
Schro¨dinger picture states at time t are in 1 − 1 relation to histories ter-
minating at t, i.e. of the form α−(t). We used a special case of this earlier
(for single time histories). More generally, for a history α = 〈αkn , ..., αk1〉 of
configurations at times tn, .., t1, let Cα be the time-ordered product of the asso-
ciated Hiesenberg-picture projection operators (a chain operator ; see appendix
1). The relationship between Schro¨dinger picture states at time tn resulting
from the history α is, up to normalization:
|α−(t)〉 = exp−iHt/~ Cα−(t)|Ω〉 = exp−iHt/~
∑
α∈α−(t)
Cα|Ω〉. (5)
That is, the Schro¨dinger picture state at time t is (the forward evolution to
t) of a superposition of Heisenberg-picture states |α〉 = Cα|Ω〉, all with the
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same sequence of configurations α−(t) up to time t. Let ‘worlds’, as before, be
represented by maximal branch vectors |α〉. Do worlds overlap or diverge?
Here is the point made graphically. Fig 1a depicts the orbit of a Schro¨dinger
picture wave-function that develops into a superposition of components E, F
and G, with squared norms as indicated; this explains how branches came by
their name. But the branches themselves can be depicted in two ways, by either
Fig 1b or Fig 1c. In Fig 1c it seems that branches do not overlap, whereas in Fig
1b it seems that they do. Which of them is correct? Evidently the difference
concerns only their amplitudes; of the two, Fig 1c is the obvious representation
for Heisenberg picture vectors, which each have a unique amplitude. Fig 1b
depicts rather graphs of Schro¨dinger picture states subject to state collapse,
without renormalizing. Which of them is the ‘correct’ picture? But once stated
in this way, the suspicion is that whether worlds in EQM diverge or overlap
is underdetermined by the mathematics. One can use either picture; they are
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better or worse adapted to different purposes.
If so, it is pretty clear which is the right one for making sense of uncer-
tainty. But of course Fig 1c is only a visual aid: can we be sure that the
Heisenberg-picture branch vectors do not overlap? This, perhaps, is a technical
philosophical question, to be settled by a theory of parts and wholes for vectors
– by a vector mereology.
Alas, there is no such theory, or none on which there is any agreement.
Mereology, if it is close to any branch of mathematics, is close to set theory
(Lewis [1991)], but even there its links are controversial. We are going to have
to make this up as we go along. And it is a good question, at this point,
as to where the burden of proof really lies. Mereology has paid little or no
dividends in pure mathematics, let alone in physics. It is at bottom an a priori
metaphysical theory. A very good desideratum on any reasonable metaphysics
is that it makes sense of our best physical theory, rather than nonsense.
Metaphysicians can, however, reasonably insist on an existence proof – a
demonstration that at least one vector space mereology can be defined in terms
of which maximal branches in EQM do not overlap. Here is a simple construction
that depends essentially on the branching structure of a consistent history space.
Let maximal branch vectors |α〉 be defined as before. Any non-maximal branch
vector Cβ |Ω〉 = |β〉 can then be written (appendix 1):
|β〉 =
∑
α∈β
|α〉.
By the consistency condition, 〈α|α′〉 = 0 for α 6= α′; therefore for any two
branch vectors |β〉, |γ〉 if 〈β|γ〉 6= 0 there exists a unique branch vector |δ〉 and
orthogonal branch vectors |β′〉, |γ′〉 such that
|β〉 = |β′〉+ |δ〉, |γ〉 = |γ′〉+ |δ〉
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namely the vector:
|δ〉 =
∑
α∈β∩γ
|α〉.
Our candidate mereology is then: a branch vector |〉 is part of |′〉) (denote
P (|〉, |′〉) if and only if either (a)  = ′ or (b) there exists a non-zero branch
vector |δ〉 such that 〈|δ〉 = 0, |〉+ |δ〉 = |′〉.
Standard axioms of mereology are listed in appendix 2; it is easy to check
that they are satisfied by the parthood relation just defined. From the overlap
relation derived from P , we see that orthogonal vectors do not overlap.
It follows that every branch vector is part of the universal state |Ω〉, as
seems appropriate, but that orthogonal branch vectors have no parts in common.
Since, by consistency, branching always produces orthogonal branch vectors, the
branch vector representing Alice seeing spin down has no part in common with
that representing Alice seeing spin up. On this basis branches of this kind
diverge, in the philosophical sense, as do maximal branches.
But in what sense, it might be asked, is Alice represented as a part of a
maximal branch vector |α〉?– for the latter (on our candidate mereology) has no
vectors as proper parts. The answer is that Alice is represented not by a vector
at all, but by a sub-sequence β of configurations of α = 〈α+, .., α−〉 (see again
S1, and our use of ordered pairs (β, |α〉) – given which, questions about Alice
and the part-whole relation in Alice’s world are treated quasiclassically. It can
hardly be objected that there must exist a uniform theory of mereology that
applies across the board to emergent ontology. Far from it: that is a piece of
metaphysics that has had little or no success in the special sciences. We concede
only that one might be constructible in each domain.
With that it should be clear that our vector mereology on its own does not
settle the question of uncertainty. Alice’s successors downstream of branching
diverge from each other, but they may still overlap with Alice prior to branching,
even given our vector mereology. A branch can be coarse-grained from the time
t of branching in such a way that it is degenerate with respect to Alice seeing
spin-up and Alice seeing spin-down. Thus a branch vector that represents only
Alice’s past α−(t) at t (of the form |α−(t)〉 = Pαk(tk)...Pα−(t−)|Ω〉, tk ≤ t,
the Heisenberg-picture analogue of Eq.(5)) represents Alice as containing all
her possible future selves, that is, as overlapping completely, according to our
mereology, with all her possible future selves, even if they do not overlap with
each other.
And there, in a nutshell, is the contrary view: by all means take the parthood
relation as specified, but let ‘Alice’ be indexed to time, and be represented
by a Schro¨dinger picture vector accordingly (as given by Eq.(5)), or by the
Heisenberg-picture branch vector |α−(t)〉, rather than by relativization to a
maximal branch. Alice in this sense overlaps with all of her successors, and the
grounds for self-locating uncertainty evaporate.
We always knew we had this option, however. This is to reject S1 not on the
grounds that worlds in EQM really overlap (on our proposed mereology they
do not), but because superpositions of worlds overlap, and because (so goes the
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objection) persons and things should be represented by superpositions of worlds,
superpositions of vectors.
But why should they? We can do the same in the case of diverging worlds
of the sort usually considered by metaphysicians (having nothing to do with
quantum mechanics), or as they arise in cosmic inflation (see e.g. Tegmark
[2010]. In either case it is uncontroversial that worlds do not overlap, but still,
sets of worlds do. Let a person or a thing up to time t be a set of worlds,
namely of those that contain that person or thing or one qualitatively identical
up to time t (which could be far in the future): then there is no uncertainty of
where a person or thing is located among worlds that diverge after that time,
either. But metaphysicians are unlikely to take this proposal very seriously, not
least because it makes nonsense of much of what we say. Nor should we in the
analogous case in EQM.18
To conclude: there is no good reason to think EQM is really a theory of over-
lapping worlds. If questions of overlap of branches are to be settled by appeal
to the underlying mathematics, in terms of vector space structure, then there
is at least one natural mereology in terms of which worlds that differ in some
feature, since orthogonal, are non-overlapping. The semantics S1-S4 does not
misrepresent the underlying mathematical structure of the theory; in terms of
this mereology, it correctly describes worlds as non-overlapping.
But it does follow that the word ‘branching’ is something of a misnomer, in
the context of EQM, in the philosophers’ sense of the word. But then the word
‘diverging’ is also infelicitous. ‘Branching’ (inappropriately in EQM) suggests
overlap, ‘divergence’ (inappropriately in EQM) suggests the absence of physical
relations. I see nothing wrong with continuing to call EQM a theory of branching
worlds, but only because the expression is well-established among physicists19
and because it is fundamental to EQM that worlds, by superposition, do make
up a dynamical unity – that they are all parts of the universal sate. At any
rate, it will mark a new phase in the status of the Everett interpretation if the
debate is over what the theory should be called.
Acknowledgements: My debt to David Wallace is obvious, but additional
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18Note added Sep 2016. Paul Tappenden has argued for the merits of this picture on other
grounds (Tappenden [2011a]. He also offers arguments why, even if there is no self-locating
uncertainty prior to branching in EQM, uncertainty can nevertheless be grounded on post-
branching (Vaidman) uncertainty (Tappenden [2011b]). See also his criticisms of Saunders
and Wallace [2008a,b] in Tappenden [2008]).
19Although some talk of ‘parallel’ worlds instead (see e.g. Tegmark [2010]). There is clearly
a case for this terminology.
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Appendix 1: Decoherent quantum histories
For each k, let Pαk , αk = 1, 2, ... be an exhaustive, commuting set of projection
operators on a Hilbert space H, (a partition of unity):∑
αk
Pαk = I, PαkPα′k = δαkα′kPαk .
The αk’s are to be thought of as coarse-grained cells of some parameter space (for
the same of simplicity, say configuration space).20 Let H be the Hamiltonian,
assumeed time-independent; the associated Heisenberg picture operators for
time tk are then:
Pαk(tk) = e
iHtk/~Pαe
−iHtk/~.
The simplest history spaces are those for which the partition of unity is the same
at each time. Let t1 < t2 < ... < tn, and consider a history α = 〈αn, ..., α1〉; the
associated chain (sometimes also called ‘class’) operator is:
Cα = Pαn(tn)Pαn−1(tn−1)...Pα1(t1).
The Cα’s are self-adjoint and positive (but not idempotent); they define a
positive-operator-valued measure (POV measure). Acting on the state |Ω(t0)〉
at t = 0 (abbreviate as |Ω〉) we obtain branch state vectors Cα|Ω〉 = |α〉. These
are in 1:1 correspondence with Schro¨dinger picture states |α(tn)〉, as would be
obtained by measuring in sequence each Pαk at time tk, applying the projection
postulate in each case. The correpondence (c.f. Eq.(5) section 4) is:
|α(tn)〉 = e−iHtn/~Cα|Ω〉.
The probability p(α of history α is the product of the probabilities for each
individual step (where the probability of each step is as given by the Born rule).
Formally:
p(α) = ‖|Cα|Ω〉‖2 = Tr(CαρC†α) (6)
where ρ = |Ω〉〈Ω| is the density matrix for the state |Ω〉 and ‘Tr’ is the trace
(Tr(O) =
∑
k〈φk|Oφk〉, for any operator O and orthonormal basis {|φk〉} over
H). Likewise, the conditional probability of α (for tn < ... < tk+1) given β (for
tk < ... < t1) is
pρ(α/β) =
Tr(Cα∗βρC
†
α∗β)
Tr(CβρC
†
β)
.
where α ∗β is the history comprising β (up to time tk) and α (from tk+1 to tn).
But whether or not these quantities can really be interpreted as probabilities
– granted that repeatable measurements of the projectors Pαk are not in fact
performed – is another matter.
20Coarse-grainings of phase space are also possible, even yielding projective-valued mea-
sures; for example, by using von Neumann’s construction (his ‘building bricks of reality’, cited
by Everett [1973]; von Neumann[1932 p.409]. Jumping foreward, see Halliwell [2010] for the
definition of decoherent histories in terms of coarse grainings (integrals) of local densities.
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Consider again the concept of coarse-graining of a parameter space (like
configuration space). It extends naturally to chain operators: for each k, let
{αk} be a coarse graining of {αk}, so that each finer-grained cell αk is contained
in some coarser grained cell αk in the parameter space. We can then speak of
coarsening and fine-grainings of histories too. Now consider a set of histories
with chain operators {Cα}, and a coarse-graining with chain operators {Cα}.
The two are simply related:
Cα =
∑
α∈α
Cα
where the sum is over all finer-grained histories α contained within α. However,
it by no means follows that the i probabilities of coarse-grainings of fine-grained
histories are the sum of the probabilities of the fine-grained histories. The sum
rule
p(α) =
∑
α∈α
p(α). (7)
is a substantive constraint.21 A sufficient condition for the sum rule is that
vectors representing the fine-grained histories are approximately orthogonal:
〈CαΩ|Cα′Ω〉 = 〈α|α′〉 ≈ 0, α 6= α′. (8)
Histories (for fixed Hamiltonian H and state |Omega〉 that satisfy (8) are called
consistent (by Griffiths and Omne`s); (medium) decoherent (by Gell-Mann and
Hartle)22 Given consistency, Everett’s relativization is a transitive relation even
in time-like directions; it is automatically transitive in space-like directions by
virtue of microcausality).
The additivity condition for a 1-place history, assuming (6), is automatically
satisfied (Everett in his [1957] turned this reasoning around: assuming additivity,
he derived (6)). It is satisfied by two-time histories as well, but in the general
case it fails. A maximal set of consistent histories defines a consistent history
space. If in addition the histories of such a space obey quasi-classical equations,
the history space is called (following Gell-Man and Hartle [1993]) a quasiclassical
domain.
It follows too that for any consistent history space there exists a fine-graining
{Pα} which is consistent and for which, for any tn > tm and for any αn with
Pαn(tn)|Ψ〉 6= 0, there exists exactly one αm such that
Pαn(tn)Pαm(tm)|Ψ〉 6= 0
(Griffiths [1993], Wallace [2012 p.92-94.]). That is, for each αn at time tn, there
is a unique history preceding it – the set of histories can be fine-grained so as
to have a purely branching structure (with no recombination of branches).
21For example, in the 2-slit experiment, it is not satisfied by histories so fine-grained as to
show through which slit each particle goes.
22The necessary and sufficient condition for the sum rule (7) is that only the real part of
(9) vanish (or approximately vanish). But the stronger condition is the more robust, and is
automatically satisfied in a quasiclassical domain.
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The consistency condition and the quantum histories formalism is widely
considered a generalization of quantum theory as, fundamentally, a theory of
probability. As such there is a continuum infinity of consistent history spaces
available – new resources for the exploration of quantum systems, indeed. But
from the point of view of EQM, consistency is far too weak a condition to give
substance to the notion of histories as autonomous and robust structures in the
universal sate, our abiding criteria for the existence of worlds.
Appendix 2: Axioms of mereology
We write ‘Pxy’ for ‘x is part of y’; this relation is reflexive, transitive, and
antisymmetric. Defined notions are:
Overlap Oxy =
def
∃z(Pzx&Pzy).
Underlap Uxy =
def
∃z(Pxz&Pyz).
Fusion x unionsq y =
def
ιz∀w(Pxw&Pyw → Pzw).
(In words, x and y overlap if a part of x is a part of y; they underlap if there
is something of which they are both parts; and their fusion is the unique thing
that is a part of anything of which x and y are both parts.) The elementary
axioms of mereology are:
M1 ∀x(x unionsq x) = x
M2 ∀x∀y(Uxy → ∃z(z = x unionsq y))
M3 ∀z(Pxz&Pyz → Px unionsq yz)
(the fusion of anything with itself is itself; if two things underlap then their
fusion exists; anything which underlaps two things is part of the fusion of those
things). Define the parthood relation as above:
Vector Part P (|β〉, |γ〉) if and only if either (a) β = γ, or (b) there exists a
non-zero branch |δ〉 such that 〈δ|β〉 = 0, |β〉+ |δ〉 = |γ〉.
It is simple to check that P is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. The
fusion operation as defined by P is:
• If 〈β|γ〉 = 0, | β〉 unionsq |γ〉 = |β〉+ |γ〉
• If 〈β|γ〉 6= 0, β ∈ γ, | β〉 unionsq |γ〉 = |γ〉; γ ∈ β, | β〉 unionsq |γ〉 = |β〉.
It clearly satisfies M1-M3.
24
References
Aharonov, Y., D. Albert, and L. Vaidman [1988], ‘How the result of a measurement
of a component of the spin of a spin- 12 particle can turn out to be 100’, Physical
Review Letters 60, 1351-54.
Aharanov, Y., and L. Vaidman [1993], ‘Protective measurements’, Physics Letters
A 178 p. 38.
Davidson, D. [2001], Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2nd ed.). Oxford
University Press.
Deutsch, D. [1999], ‘Quantum theory of probability and decisions’, Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London A455, 3129–3137. Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-
ph/9906015.
— [2010], ’Apart from universes’, in Saunders et al [2010], pp.542-52.
Everett III, H. [1957], ‘Relative state formulation of quantum mechanics’, Reviews
of Modern Physics 29, 454-62.
— [1973], ‘Theory of the universal wave-function’, in The Many-Worlds Interpre-
tation of Quantum Mechanics, B. De Witt and N. Graham (eds.), pp.3-140,
Princeton University Press.
Gell-Mann, M. and J.B. Hartle [1990], ‘Quantum Mechanics in the light of quan-
tum cosmology’, in Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information, W.H.
Zurek, ed., Reading, Addison-Wesley.
— [1993], ‘Classical equations for quantum systems’, Physical Review D 47, 3345-
382. Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9210010.
Greaves, H. [2004], ‘Understanding Deutsch’s probability in a deterministic multi-
verse’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35, 423-56. Avail-
able online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001742/.
— [2007], ‘On the Everettian epistemic problem’, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics 38, 120-152. Available online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002953.
Greaves, H. and W. Myrvold [2010], ‘Everett and evidence’, in Saunders et al [2010],
pp.264-304.
Griffiths, R. [1993], ‘Consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics using quantum
trajectories’, Physical Review Letters 70, 2201-2204.
Halliwell, J. [2010], ‘Macroscopic superposition, decoherent histories, and the emer-
gence of hydrodynamic behaviour’, in Saunders et al [2010], pp.99-117.
Ismael, J. [2003], ‘How to combine chance and determinism: Thinking about the
future in an Everett universe’, Philosophy of Science 70, 776–790.
Johnston, M. [1989], ‘Fission and the facts’, Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 369-397.
Kent, A. [2010], ‘One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of
evolution, probability, and scientific confirmation’, in Saunders et al [2010].
Ladyman, J. and D. Ross [2007], Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized,
Oxford.
Lewis, D. [1973], Counterfactuals. Harvard.
— [1986a], Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford.
— [1986b], On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell.
— [1991], Parts of Classes, Blackwell.
25
Lubkin, E. [1979], ‘An application of ideal experiments to quantum mechanical mea-
surement theory’, International Journal of Theoretical Physics 18, 165-77.
Papineau, D. [1996], ‘Comment on Lockwood’, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 47, 233-41.
Saunders, S. [1994], ‘Decoherence and evolutionary adaptation’, Physics Letters A
184, p.1-5.
— [1997], ‘Naturalizing metaphysics’, The Monist 80, 44-69.
— [1998], ‘Time, quantum mechanics, and probability’, Synthese, 114, pp.405-44.
Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112081.
— [2004], ‘Derivation of the Born Rule from Operational Assumptions’, Proceedings
of the Royal Society A 460, 1-18. Available online at https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-
ph/0211138
— [2005], ‘What is probability?’, in Quo Vadis Quantum Mechanics, A. Elitzur, S.
Dolev, and N. Kolenda, eds., Springer. Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-
ph/0412194.
Saunders, S., and D. Wallace [2008a] ‘Branching and uncertainty’, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 59, 293 - 305. Available online at http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003811/.
— [2008b], ‘Saunders and Wallace reply’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 59, 315-17.
Saunders, S., J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace (eds.)[2010], Many Worlds? Ev-
erett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, Oxford.
Savage, L. [1954], The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley.
Tappenden, P. [2008], ‘Comment on Saunders and Wallace’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 59, 306-314.
— [2011a], ‘A metaphysics for semantic internalism’, Metaphysica12, 125-36. Avail-
able online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8721/.
– [2011b], Evidence and uncertainty in Everetts multiverse, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 62, pp. 99123. Available online at http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/5046/.
Tegmark, M. [2010], ’Many worlds in context’, in Saunders et al [2010] pp.553-81.
Uffink, J. [2000] ‘How to protect the interpretation of the wave function against pro-
tective measurements’. Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9903007v1.
Vaidman, L. [1998], ‘On schizophrenic experiences of the neutron or why we should
believe in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory’, International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12, 245–261.
Van Fraassen, B. [1980], The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Von Neumann, J. [1932], Mathematische Grundlagen Der Quantenmechanik, trans-
lated by R.T. Beyer as Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Prince-
ton University Press, 1955.
Wallace, D. [2005], ‘Language use in a branching universe’, available online at
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002554.
— [2006], ‘Epistemology quantized: circumstances in which we should come to be-
lieve in the Everett interpretation’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
57, 655-689. Available online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002839.
26
— [2010], ‘How to prove the Born rule’, in Saunders et al [2010] pp.227-63. Available
online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4709/
— [2012], The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory according to the Everett In-
terpretation, Oxford.
Wilson, A. [2011], ‘Macroscopic ontology in Everettian quantum mechanics, Philo-
sophical Quarterly 61, pp. 36382.
— [2013], ‘Objective probability in Everettian quantum mechanics’, Britisch Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 64, 709-37.
Zurek, W. [2005], ‘Probabilties from entanglement, Born’s rule pk = |ψk|2 from en-
variance’, Physical Review A71, 052105. Available online at https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-
ph/0405161
27
